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THE CULTURE OF AN EMPIRE; THE
STRUCTURE OF A REPUBLIC
JAMES WILSON 1

Whatever the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal's constitutional implications, implications that this piece shall soon explore in some
depth, the episode will endure as an excessively graphic metaphor for the squalid nature of America's political culture at the
end of the Twentieth Century. Clinton is certainly neither the
first nor the last American politician to use the status and power
of his office to satisfy his sexual lust. Nor is Kenneth Starr the
only prosecutor who attempted to grind someone to bits for political glory, even though he did turn out to be quite a crybaby
when he wanted to impeach Clinton for conducting an overly
zealous defense against his overly zealous prosecution. The
Democratic Party has been as willing to compromise its moral
integrity by standing by its shameless President as it had been
eager to desert its ideological legitimacy by betraying American
workers to NAFTA/GATT. 2 Alan Greenspan 3 is permitted to
Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. AB. 1969, Princeton University; J.D.
1974, University of Chicago. The author wishes to thank Noam Chomsky, Sheldon Gelman, Steve Lazarus and Leon Boyd for their attentive reading of this manuscript.
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, 26 U.S.C. §3301, et. seq. (1993); North
America Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S. - Can. - Mex., 32 I.L.M. 603 (1993)
(hereinafter "NAFTA"); see also NAFTA, 19 U.S.C.A § 3301, et. seq. (1998) (beginning in
June 1990, when presidents of the United States and Mexico announced their intention
to negotiate free trade agreement, to create a tri-national agreement that included Canada, a lively debate has occurred in United States about the actual benefits of the agreement); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5), (6), 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter "GATT 1947"] (noting GATT as one of primary organizations
dealing with issues of international trade policy, with a primary purpose of protect a free
and orderly international trading system). See generally Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Eric
Griego, The Labor Dimension of the NAFTA: Reflections on the First Year, 12 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 473, 474 (1995) (reasoning potential for free trade and investment flows
between United States and Mexico would raise difficulties for U.S. producers and workers because of significantly lower labor costs in Mexico).
3 Chairman of the Federal Reserve. See <<http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/bios/Greenspan.
html>> (visited Feb. 15, 1999) (providing biography for Chairman Greenspan, noting that
he was appointed Chairman on August 11, 1987 and reappointed to full 7 year term beginning February 1, 1992); see also David C. Yamada, Voices From the Cubicle: Protecting
and EncouragingPrivate Employee Speech in the Post Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKLEY
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fight "wage inflation" among regular workers but never needs to
worry about the disproportionate wage increases that have accrued to the well to do over the past two decades. Or perhaps
the postmodern Democrats, besotted with notions of "consent,"
merely have decided that business and political leaders can turn
their operations into harems so long as everyone is agreeable.
The Republican Party, which includes Big Business as its true
constituency, has created its own alienating brew of pious sadism. If the Republicans had any real political courage, they
would impeach Attorney General Janet Reno for failing to initiate legal proceedings against President Clinton and Vice President Gore 4 for flagrantly violating fundraising laws during the
last Presidential election. But that, of course, would be far too
substantive, too close to the real political scandal of subordinating every public norm (including national security) to wealth and
power.
Many Americans expressed their contempt-for Clinton, the
Washington political establishment, and the media servants of
corporate power-by not caring very much about the scandal.
The ruling class periodically offers up a politician as a sacrificial
lamb to perpetuate the imagery of popular sovereignty. This
time the public did not take the bait. They knew Clinton was no
worse substantively or morally than most of his peers. They had
already twice voted for him, knowing he was a liar and a philanderer. Perhaps they are getting sick of the media's perpetual
campaign to denigrate every politician, to make us feel there can
be no hope, no virtue in politics, making us believe our only salvation is the private market and the media's corporate owners.
Anyway, the Republicans served up Gingrich, 5 which pleased
J. EMp. & LAB. L. 1, 8 (1998) (stating "according to Alan Greenspan, chairperson of the
Federal Reserve Board, workers have refrained from seeking pay raises out of fear of
losing their jobs even when the labor market has shown signs of improvement").
4 See Michael J. Broyde & Robert A. Schapiro, Impeachment and Accountability: The
Case of the First Lady, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 479, 480 (1998) (noting Attorney General
Janet Reno's rejection of independent counsel to investigate White House fundraising led
to requests for her impeachment); see also Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the
Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2136 (1998) (concluding "the Attorney General
has refused to appoint an independent counsel for the campaign fund-raising mattered
based on a narrow analysis of the independent counsel's statute's triggering mechanism).
See, e.g., Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View From Inside, 86 GEO. L.J.
2307, 2370 (1998) (describing Janet Reno's dissatisfaction with performance of independent counsel was responsible for her failing to appoint independent counsel to investigate
alleged criminal fundraising activities by President Clinton and Vice President Gore).
5 See W. John Thomas, The Presentation of Bill Clinton Revisited: The Case for Con-
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quite a few people across the political spectrum. But that burnt
offering may not keep the discontented voters and alienated
nonvoters from throwing most of these politicians out of office,
demanding a more basic reordering of our political society.
As the reader has probably already garnered by now, the
author can claim a fair degree of nonpartisanship but certainly
not "objectivity," whatever that word could possibly mean in this
context, due to his abiding contempt for both parties' leaders.
Already the benefits of the scandal, aside from its essentially
farcical nature, have far exceeded his expectations. Clinton's
historical reputation will be perpetually tarnished with bathroom humor. Gingrich took a sudden fall, temporarily replaced
by an even harder, colder man. 6 The Republican Party, which
always manages to appear more cruel and greedy than Clinton
and the Democrats, lost ground in the 1998 congressional elections. 7 African-Americans reasserted themselves at the polls,
preferring Clinton, the sleazy womanizer who enjoys playing golf
with Vernon Jordan, to the racists who set the tone for the Retextual Analysis of Political Performance, 8 STAN. L. &POL'Y REV. 127, 129 (1997) (de-

scribing Gingrich's flirtation with public adulation as ending in fall of 1995 when he directed Republican effort in budget battle with White House, further commenting on how
loss of budget battle left Republican Party weakened which resulted in Gingrich's approval rating beginning to plummet, bottoming out in January of 1997 at 15%, 9 points
lower than President's Nixon's when he resigned); see also Richard L. Berke, Democrats
Mourn Loss of Ideal Foil, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 8, 1998, at 1 (quoting Democratic Media Consultant as stating, "In the way the Republic party spent years using Ted Kennedy as
their punching bags-and made millions in direct mail off him-I don't think we've ever
had a better villain than Newt"). See generally Allison R. Myerson, From One Fallen
Speaker to Another, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998, at Al (noting that former speaker Jim
Wright was not gloating from Gingrich's resignation).
6 See Philip Buchan, Elections Point to New Approaches in Congress, 35 TRIAL 11, 12
(1999) (discussing how resignation of Speaker Newt Gingrich and election of speakerdesignate Robert Livingston could significantly alter House's leadership style). See generally Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Electric RestructuringLegislation: Handicappingthe 106t '
Congress, FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 1, 1999, at 33 (discussing Robert Livingston's resignation
during President Clinton's impeachment proceedings after admitting to martial infidelities of his own); Katherine Q. Seelye, Mix of Old and New is to Lead House G.O.P. , N. Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at A2 (noting Robert Livingston's succession to Speaker of the
House of Representatives).
7 See Adam Nagourney, A Partyso Happy it Could Burst, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998,
at D4 (noting Democrats wrest five seats from House Republicans); The 106th Congress:
What to expect In 1999, Taxcuts: There Will Be Some, But..., 20 JUD/LEGIS.WATCH REP.,
1, 3 (1999) (illustrating how Republicans believe that lack of political and legislative
agenda caused them to lose a small number of seats in election in which they could have
expected to pick up several seats); see also Karen Hansen, DemocratsEke Out Slim Wins.
(Democratic Party's Performance In The November 1998 Legislative Elections), STATE
LEGISLATURES, Dec. 1, 1998, available in, 1998 WL 12872101, at *1 (stating Democrats
bucked conventional wisdom and won seats in state legislative races when history indicated that they should have lost big in off year election).
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publican Party. Only a fool forgets Willie Horton.8 And we can
now periodically make a sexual allusion at work or in class without being branded sexual harassers. For instance, it is now very
hard to teach the impeachment material in a constitutional law
class without making a double entendre, whether one wants to
or not. But there have been costs as well. Hillary Clinton has
apparently regained favor with the media elite and perhaps with
much of the public. She probably took a poll to determine
whether staying with him or leaving him would best advance her
political career. Children of every age now know all about oral
sex and the permissibility, or at least the lack of importance, of
deception, lying, and perjury. Concerned, humane people have
more reasons to turn away from contemporary politics, which is
nauseatingly voyeuristic, self-absorbed, and self-righteous. Many
bosses will feel less restraint in searching out compliant sexual
partners among their subordinates. So what if the employee
gets special access, inside information, and enhanced career opportunities? So what if other employees must facilitate the sexual encounters, turn their heads, or suppress their moral indignation? They should get with the Nineties. Consensual sexual
power is not only "private," but it also is cool. Just don't be
crassly ineffective and insensitive, like Clarence Thomas. 9
s See Robert S. Blanco, Mixing Politics and Crime, FED.PROBATION, Dec. 1995, at 91
(reviewing David C. Anderson, Crime and the Politics of Hysteria (1995)) (discussing
Willie Horton, a black male, who committed a heinous crime while on furlough from
prison; the victims were a young and upcoming white couple, picked at random; further
noting that the fact that this crime could have been prevented infuriated the public and
captured fear of middle class); see also Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Three Strikes
and You're Out! The Political Sentencing Game, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1995, at 4 (discussing series of events that led Willie Horton to become poster child of Republicans and
reminded Democrats that appearing to be soft on criminals and crimes was politically
incorrect). See, e.g., Gerald F. Velmen, Victim's Rights in California, 8 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 197, 202 (1992) (referring to moral bankruptcy of national political
leadership as "Willie Horton Syndrome" meaning "where political leaders with ambitions
for higher office become so obsessed with maintaining a 'tough on crime' image they
measure every decision in terms of media labels that might be hung around their necks).
9 See Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Examining the Judicial Nomination Process: The Politics of Advice and Consent, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 27 (1992) (discussing surrounding circumstances around sexual harassment allegations of Professor Anita Hill against Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas, which resulted in Senate postponing its vote on Thomas'
nomination and directing judiciary committee to investigate and conduct hearings on allegations); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Gender, Race, and the Anita Hill / Clarence
Thomas Hearings, the View From and to Congress, 65 S.CAL. L. REV. 1497, 1497 (1992)
(referring to scandal as compelling story specifically with "[p]oised, articulate Anita Hill
describing sexual harassment in graphic detail" and "proud and angry Clarence Thomas
vehemently calling Hill liar and charging his accuser with racism"). See generally Richard Davis, The Supreme Court Nominations and the News Media, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1061,
1068 (1994) (noting three major television networks devoted sixty six hours of coverage
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But enough ranting, at least for the moment. The white heat
of outrage can inspire and focus legal/political analysis, but at
some point it becomes tiresome, almost as self-indulgent as the
ruling class it despises. On another level of abstraction, this article is an exercise in transforming partisan passion into legal
analysis. This constitutional controversy has raised interesting
technical questions across the constitutional law and politics
spectrum that are worth reconsidering through the light of this
enduring anger. The main thesis I offer, with only a dash of
irony, is that the Supreme Court saved Bill Clinton's presidency.
What would have happened if the Court had not already upheld
the constitutionality of independent counsels in Morrison v. 01sen,1 0 permitted Paula Jones to pursue her sexual harassment
lawsuit against the President while he was still in office in
Clinton v. Jones,1 1 and apparently determined that all impeachment issues are nonjusticiable "political questions" in
Nixon v. United States?12 Linda Tripp still would have taped the
conversations; Monica Lewinsky would have stalked after
Clinton while saving the stained dress and the phone messages;
and the Clinton Administration would have launched its usual
to second round of Clarence Thomas hearings after Anita Hill's sexual harassment
charges surfaced).
l0 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (upholding Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. § 593,
against Art. III, appointments clause and separation of powers challenges); see also
Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of ConstitutionalDecisionmaking:Politics and the Tenure
Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1167 (1988) (commenting on how resolution of
removal issue in Morrison created what could be Court's most lasting contribution to
separation of power analysis). See, e.g., Thomas S. Martin, Independent Counsel Checks and Balances, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 536, 537 (1990) (noting absence of controls
on independent counsels that exist to protect citizens against prosecutorial abuse presents great danger to individual liberty).
11 520 U.S. 681, 683 (1997) (holding that subjecting sitting President to civil suit does
not violate separation of powers); see also L. Darnell Weeden, The President and Mrs.
Jones Were in Federal Court: The Litigation Established No ConstitutionalImmunity for
President Clinton, 7 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 361, 364 (1999) (summarizing Court's rejection
of President Clinton's argument that Constitution required federal courts to defer civil
litigation based on conduct that allegedly took place before he assumed office as President). See generally Howard Kurtz, Paula Jones Speaks To National Media About
Clinton Suit, WASH POST, June 17, 1994, at All (commenting on Jones's sexual harassment suit against President Clinton).
12 506 U.S. 224, 228-33 (1993) (ruling that impeachment trials are to be conducted by
Senate); see also Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights:
The Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 126 (1993) (criticizing Nixon
decision for not respecting judicial review as integral part of meaningful separation of
powers doctrine in order to protect judicial independence as well as individual rights).
See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Non-Justifiability: Judicial Review of
Impeachment's After Nixon, 44 DUKE L.J. 231, 232 (1994) (concluding "Nixon raised the
issue of whether, without judicial review, Congress is able to make constitutional decisions in a reasonably principled fashion").
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vendetta against any woman sexually linked to the President.
But there would have not have been a preexisting, hectoring,
prudish Independent Counsel, appointed by a partisan Judge
with partisan support. Clinton wouldn't have gotten bogged
down in a politically motivated lawsuit with Paula Jones; he just
would have been seen for the vicious, lying scoundrel that he is.
Maybe he wouldn't have committed the impeachable offenses of
civil perjury and obstruction of justice, but he would not have
been able to hide behind his clumsy enemies.
Without Nixon v. United States,13 the impeachment process

would have been even more polluted by lawyers and law professors' claims of privileged wisdom; the citizens might have felt
less need to think for themselves because the legal system was
allegedly taking care of the problem. Who knows: The initial
polls may have come out against Clinton when the evidence had
caught up with him just two months before the congressional
elections. The Democratic Party might have forced him to do
what he should have done anyway if he truly had the country's
best interests at heart: RESIGN. Assuming there probably is
some truth to this hypothesis, what does it say about the role of
those three important Supreme Court decisions in the future?
One could say that the Court should never revisit prior constitutional holdings because of subsequent events. But one of the
core doctrines of constitutional law is the limited influence of
precedent.1 4 With the notable exception of Constitutional
Amendments, only the Supreme Court can alter constitutional
legal doctrine in most cases. Thus it can correct for its earlier
"mistakes." Because it is often difficult to determine what is the
"right answer" in the first place, how is the Court to ascertain its
errors? Changes in public opinion and court personnel obviously
matter. But so does reality. What if the crime rate had rapidly
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 83, 845 (1992) (construing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)) (concluding essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and
reaffirmed based on fundamental constitutional principals of institutional integrity and
rule of "stare decisis"); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 756 (1988) (examining justifications for adjudication in light of societal justified departures from constitution's original meaning). See,
e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity and Justice in
Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 3027 (1996) (illustrating how stare decisis is just one
manifestation of idea that there is something inherent in decision making consistency
itself that has "normative value" and "demands respect").
13
14
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dropped after the Warren Court implemented its reforms in
criminal procedure? What if affirmative action had worked so
well that few minorities continued to need any special preferences? Or, in our situation, what damage, if any, has Kenneth
Starr and Paula Jones done to our country? These recent events
have confirmed my initial reaction that laws establishing independent counsels are unconstitutional. 15 Quite simply, a politically unaccountable criminal prosecutor is a shocking, untraditional procedure that violates the criminal defendant's right to
due process. All defendants have a right to have their case considered in the context of the administration's overall experience,
mission, and political accountability.
The current system also drags the federal courts into virulently partisan politics. Judge Sentelle, a very conservative jurist with close connections to rabid politicians like Senator Jesse
Helms and Lauch Faircloth, rejected the first choice for independent counsel, the well-respected Robert B. Fiske, Jr. Instead
he chose Kenneth Starr, who had well-known political ambitions. 16 Furthermore, the Court has periodically had to revise,
expand, and revive Starr's floating jurisdiction. 1 7 This confirms
Justice Scalia's warning in Morrison:
An independent counsel is selected, and the scope of his or
15 See James G. Wilson, Altered States: A Comparisonof Separation of Powers in the
United States and in the United Kingdom, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 125 (1990) (agreeing with Scalia's dissenting opinion that laws establishing independent counsels are unconstitutional).
i1 See David Johnston, Three Judges Spurn Protest on Whitewater Prosecutor, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at A16 (noting that request for investigation into Starr's partisan
activities was rebuffed by court); David Johnston, Appointment in Whitewater Turns Into
a PartisanBattle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1994, at A4 (noting Democratic members' uproar
over appointment of Republican Kenneth Starr as independent prosecutor); Phil Kuntz &
Edward Felsenthal, For Starr the Impact of the Jones Ruling is Mainly Political,WALL
ST. J., Apr. 2, 1998, at A24 (noting that Starr was branded partisan politico from inception of investigation).
17 See Order, In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-1, at 1-2
(D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Jan. 16, 1998) (expanding independent prosecutor, Kenneth Starr's
jurisdiction, specifically to investigate "whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned
perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated federal law other
than a class B or C misdemeanor or infraction in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses, attorneys or others concerning civil case Jones v. Clinton"); see also Ken Gormley,
An OriginalModel of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601, 662 (1998)
(discussing how rapid expansion of Starr's probe into Monica Lewinsky scandal provides
useful case study of how independent counsels can expand their jurisdiction almost at
will); Joshua M. Perttula, The Political Price of the Independent Counsel Law, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 257, 271 (1998) (finding that since initial allegations stemming
from Whitewater, Starr's jurisdiction has expanded to three unrelated issues including
travel office matter, missing F.B.I. files and Monica Lewinsky sex scandal).
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her authority prescribed, by a panel of judges. What if they
are politically partisan, as judges have been known to be,
and select a prosecutor antagonistic to the [administration]?
There is no remedy for that, not even a political one. 18
Although there can never be a clear line between law and politics, the Court should interpret the Constitution to keep the
Federal judiciary out of the most virulent acts of partisanship.
But there is an alternative to the Court's reconsidering Morrison. The Act will soon expire, 19 and Congress need not pass any
variant in the future. It is also quite likely that the next President, of whatever party, will veto any such law. After all, special
prosecutors also attacked Presidents Bush and Reagan. 2 0 Thus,
on a practical level, Kenneth Starr may have effectively overruled Morrison for the foreseeable future. Many supporters of
Morrison may find that solution palatable.
It is consistent to argue that independent counsels are a bad
idea, but Congress should have the constitutional power to create them as a powerful check against Executive abuses. An alternative that worked very well in the past, is for Congress and
18 Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 729 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (illustrating
inherent dangers in appointing an independent counsel). See Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 506 (1996)
(stating that political independence of special division judges is intended to ensure that
they will choose truly "independent" independent counsels but it also means that if they
do not, there is no accountability and equally important, no politically feasible remedy).
See generally Peter M. Shane, Independent Policy Making and Presidential Power, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 624 (1989) (examining Justice Scalia's argument "that the independent counsel offends the constitutional commitment to due process because the judicial appointment of a prosecutor to investigate a single potential defendant undermines
the values of prosecutorial detachment, impartiality, and accountability").
19 See The Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1993 & Supp. 1998)
(stating that five years after date of enactment Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act
of 1994 will no longer be effective); see also John Gibeaut, In Whitewater's Wake: With the
Law That Made the Starr Report Possible up for Renewal, the March to Impeachment
Proceedings May Become Footstepson the Grave of Independent Counsel Act, 84 A.B.A. J.
36, 36 (1998) (stating how statute will expire on June 30, 1999 unless Congress renews
it); Norman J. Orenstein, Doing Congress' Dirty Work, 86 GEO. L.J. 2179, 2192 (1998)
(suggesting that eliminating Independent Counsel Act may turn tide that has made politics of scandal so dominant).
20 See Matthew N. Kaplan, Who Will Guard the Guardians?Independent Counsel,
State Secrets, and JudicialReview, 18 NoVA L. REV. 1787, 1790 (1994) (indicating how
President Reagan and Bush exerted leverage over then independent counsel Lawrence
Walsh, who was responsible for investigating Iran-Contra affair); see also Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., Shared Power Under the Constitution: The Independent Counsel, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 881, 884 (1987) (declaring that Reagan administration took action that undermined
the independent counsel). See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President,
5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 143, 143 (1993) (noting special inquires into Iran-contra,
whitewater, and Monica Lewinsky matter, successively beleaguer presidents Regan,
Bush and Clinton).
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the public to pressure the President to appoint a Special Prosecutor, partially protected by repealable regulations, within the
Executive Branch. No recent President was as devious and
ruthless as Nixon, yet even he could not prevent that system
from driving him out of office. 2 1 Admittedly, that system will
generally require more bipartisanship to begin any presidential
investigation, much less to conclude it, but that restraint may be
a virtue.
As much as I distrust our past and future Presidents, I am
wary of the ever-increasing legalization and criminalization of
politics. The President should be protected by a strong presumption of legal innocence, so he or she can do her job and we can
judge that performance. In addition, the current system requires
the President to raise even more money for legal protection
against his omnipresent prosecutor and plaintiff[s], to become
even more beholden to the "special interests" that really run this
country. Although there is a tension, there is no paradox in
wanting a strong government even though one believes the current political regime has been dangerously corrupted by money.
The solution is to remove the corrupt politicians, not to strangle
the formal political system.
Relying upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Congress
probably could modify the Supreme Court's holding that Paula
Jones' civil sexual harassment suit can take place during the
Clinton presidency. 2 2 Nevertheless, some of the Court's reasoning was hardly reassuring. It relied on the fact that only three
civil lawsuits have been filed against sitting Presidents to predict that there would not be many such suits in the future. It
concluded there would be little risk of politically motivated litigation. But the very success of Jones' case, both politically and
financially, 2 3 may encourage many more such actions in the fu21 See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974) (holding that dispute between special
prosecutor and President relating to tape recordings and documentation of President's
conversations with aides was justifiable even though both parties were officers of executive branch); see also O'Sullivan, supra note 18, at 509 (reasoning "system" subsequently
worked as it should, despite President Nixon's orders to remove initial Watergate special
counsel Archibald Cox, second Watergate special prosecutor was named and inevitably
President Nixon underwent criminal prosecutions, impeachment proceedings and finally
resigned).
22 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 (1997) (noting if Congress deems it appropriate to afford President with stronger protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation).
23 See Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and Cover up Under Oath: Impeach-
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ture. Because cases like sexual harassment swing on disputed
material facts, the President will rarely prevail under summary
judgment. Given these foreseeable problems, Congress could
probably defer all civil trials and discovery until the President
leaves office. Thus, as in Morrison, there is no pressing need for
the Court to reevaluate the Jones decision, even assuming it was
wrongly decided. Whether Congress should change the Jones
doctrine or not will largely depend upon how much one enjoys
seeing Presidents in political trouble. Although Clinton may or
may not have lied more than most Presidents, he broke ground
by lying under oath in the Jones case. Perhaps the real lesson is
that it is dangerous to require Presidents to testify under oath
because they are so used to lying and getting away with it. The
old system, having lower level officials risk their careers and
reputations by dissembling to congressional committees, may be
the best one.
Nixon v. United States24 is the most important case in this
field, because it defines the basic process for resolving presidential impeachments. The Supreme Court rejected as a "political
question" Judge Nixon's claim that he was did not receive a constitutional trial because only a committee heard the entire evidence. 25 Because the claim focused on process and the word "try"
in the Constitution; the case does not technically prohibit the
able Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 259, 280 (1998) (describing Supreme Court holding that
allowed Paula Jones to sue sitting President, for a civil offense allegedly committed before he became President was a blow to Office of President); Peter Baker, Legal Questions Buffet Both Sides in Jones Settlement Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1998, at 10 (outlining details of $850,000 settlement agreement between President Clinton and Paula
Jones, his accuser). See generally Neil A. Lewis, Group Behind PaulaJones Gains Critics
as Well as Fame, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, at A18 (noting that sudden entry of conservative Christian group into Ms. Jones' lawsuits raises issues about her true motives and
those of her lawyers).
24 506 U.S. 224 (1993). The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present. U.S. CONST. Art. I.
§ 3 cl. 6., construed in Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228 (analyzing language and structure of
clause, specifically stating how first sentence is grant of authority to Senate and word
"sole" indicates that authority rests in Senate and nowhere else).
25 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 227. [I]n the trial of any impeachment the presiding officer of
the Senate, if the Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony at such times and places as the Committee may determine and
for purposes the committee may determine, and for such purposes the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate exercise all the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate
and the Presiding officer of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and
practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials. Id.

1999]

THE CULTURE OFANEMPRE

claim that the Court can interpret the substantive meaning of
"misconduct" and "High Crimes and Misdemeanors."
The
Court's reasoning, supported by very rigid doctrine, 2 6 makes it
unlikely that it would make such a distinction between impeachment process and substance. The underlying textual argument remains the same: The Constitution committed the impeachment process to the House and the Senate. Furthermore,
the Court would invariably interject itself into what would invariably by an extremely heated political controversy by reversing the elected branches' decision that a Judge or President
should be impeached. Particularly in Presidential cases, which
have so many domestic and foreign policy implications, there is a
great need for promptness and finality.
So how should the American public and Congress think about
these issues? A few years ago, I argued that constitutional
power in the United States is significantly regulated by "conventions," not just legal doctrine. 2 7 For example, past practice has
established the convention that there should be nine Justices on
the Supreme Court. Any attempt to "pack" the Court would be
presumptively unconstitutional, even if the Supreme Court cannot prevent an increase in the number of Justices. The same
analysis applies to impeachment issues, which should be more
political than legal. Relying upon precedent, constitutional theory, and public opinion, the country is developing a set of conventions about presidential impeachment. Advocates propose their
own sub-categories. Clinton's opponents argued that perjury is a
per se impeachable offense that warrants impeachment.
Clinton's advocates distinguished between sin, personal miscon26 For a discussion of the differences between Chief Justice Rehnquist's choice of a
rigid rule and the slightly more flexible approaches recommended in the two concurrence, see James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright LineBalancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 788 (1995) (comparing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's reaffirmation of most formal conception of non-justifiability, by holding that
all claims surrounding impeachment were non-justifiable with Justice Souter's concurrence in which he contended that at some outrageous point, court would be able and
should review certain impeachment procedures, such as deciding on impeachment by
flipping coin); see also Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?,85 YALE
L.J. 597, 598 (1976) (indicating that "as long as the political branches act within their
constitutional powers, whether they have done wisely or well is a 'political question'
which is not for the courts to consider").
27 James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially Unenforceable Rules That Combine With JudicialDoctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate Political
Behavior, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 645, 650 (1992) (commenting on widespread existence of
American constitutional conventions).
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duct, breach of public confidence, and threats to the constitutional system. At the Senate trial, Clinton's defense conceded
that "high crimes and misdemeanors" extends to some "private
offenses," such as murder, but not to perjury over a sexual affair. 28 Just like legal cases, there will be no clear consensus
about the meaning of the Clinton impeachment process, whatever its ultimate outcome.
Recent impeachment precedents and arguments on both sides
of the Clinton dispute demonstrate that "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" is and should be a totality of the circumstances
standard.29 Although Nixon technically had to resign because he
orchestrated an elaborate cover-up, he also lost power because
the initial crime, Watergate, was a threat to the domestic electoral system. Whether he knew about Watergate or not beforehand, he is constitutionally responsible for all White House actions. Both these offenses reinforced a preexisting belief among
many Americans that Nixon had an excessive lust for dominion.
In addition, the economy was very weak. 30 Finally, the Vietnam
War had polarized the country, making Nixon an appropriate
sacrifice. Ronald Reagan and George Bush's creation of a
shadow government, receiving funds that had not been appropriated by Congress, was another serious threat to the Constitution. 31 But impeachment efforts got nowhere because Reagan
28 See Sean Wilentz, High Crimes; It Depends on How You Define Murder,' L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, at M2 (noting that "high crimes and misdemeanors" include private offenses such as murder).
29 See Julie R. O'Sullivan, The InteractionBetween Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2224-25 (1998) (concluding that despite fact that
Congress is not limited by any express definition of impeachable offenses including high
crimes and misdemeanors, and its impeachment decisions are not subject to judicial review, congressional precedents indicate that structural safeguards constructed by Framers supplemented by practical political constraints have been sufficient to prevent Congressional abuse); see also Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Clinton-Gore
Scandals and the Question of Impeachment, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 11 (1997) (illustrating how it is misconception to assume that because "crimes and misdemeanors" are
terms of criminal law that "high crimes and misdemeanors are similarly just ordinary
crimes and misdemeanors committed by high government officials).
30 See Colbert I. King, Ghosts of Scandals Past, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1998, at 29
(commenting on interview conducted with Sen. Jesse Helms during Watergate Scandal in
which he illustrated how people's concerns over weak economy, inflation, and fuel shortage overshadowed importance of Watergate); News: Leaders, Clinton and the Markets,
AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Jan. 27, 1998, at 10 (discussing how dismal economy helped to
undermine President Nixon, specifically, during Watergate scandal U.S. share prices fell
by almost half and to further exacerbate matters Watergate coincided with soaring inflation, flat output, slower productivity growth and falling earnings which followed 1973
OPEC oil price rise).
31 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Af-
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was quite popular, the economy was thriving, and many people
believed his errors were a good faith effort to rescue hostages
and to ensure foreign policy objectives. In other words, unlike
Nixon, Reagan violated the Constitution, but he did not do so for
immediate political gain. George Bush hid his own set of lies
about his involvement in the affair under the benign shadow of
32
Ronald Reagan.
Clinton's case resembles Nixon's self-seeking in terms of lies
and obstruction of justice. Unlike the foreign policy lies of
Reagan (and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,
Nixon, and so on), there is nothing even arguably "noble" about
Clinton's destruction of the English language. But Nixon was
trying to subvert the political process. On the other hand, Nixon
never committed perjury, thereby betraying his constitutional
obligation to faithfully execute the laws. Just before the House
took its impeachment vote in December 1998, a poll indicated
that a large majority of Americans believe Clinton acted illegally,
but he should not be impeached. 3 3 In other words, they did not
accept the Democrats' argument that Clinton did not lie or commit perjury. But neither did they adopt the Republicans' conclusion that Clinton should be impeached for these acts. They made
fairs: Lessons of the Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1288 (1998) (discussing how
before Iran-Contra affair President Reagan made two deals with Congress reaching substantive policy agreements not to negotiate with terrorists over hostages and vowing not
to fund military activities with Contras, yet during Iran-Contra affair President Reagan
endorsed release of Lebanon hostages by any means, and private support for Contras);
Peter M. Shane, Focus On: Restoring Faith in Government, Presidents, Pardons, and
Prosecutors:Legal Accountability and the Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POLy REV.
361, 395 (1993) (demonstrating that Reagan administration during Iran-Contra affair
exemplified dangers posed to democracy when governments circumvent congressional
initiatives and carry out foreign affair agendas employing covert and deceptive strategies); see also David Hoffman, Iran Arms Profits Were Diverted to Contras; Pointdexter
Resigns, NSC Aide is Fired,WASH. PosT, Nov. 26, 1986, at Al (describing how American
public was outraged as President Reagan revealed on national television that up to $30
million received from covert sales of U.S. arms by Israel to Iran had been diverted by
American agents to rebels fighting against Sandinista government in Nicaragua).
32 See Harold Hongju Koh, Begging Bush's Pardon,29 HOUS. L. REV. 889, 889 (1992)
(reasoning that by pardoning last Iran-Contra defendants, President Bush "violated a
central norm of our National Security Constitution: that foreign policy exigencies do not
authorize President to nullify rule of law for his own administration"); Lawrence E.
Walsh, Political Oversight, the Rule of Law, and Iran-Contra,42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 587,
596 (1992) (concluding that President Bush's pardon of Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, ten days before his trial, not only prevented punishment but also prevented
trial which would have exposed truth about Iran-Contra).
33 See Richard L. Berke, Impeachment: The Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at A24
(indicating that "53 percent said they thought it was probably true that Mr. Clinton
committed perjury before a Federal grand jury; 19 percent said its was probably not true;
and the rest had no opinion").
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a legal judgment that Clinton is a criminal along with a political
judgment that he should not be impeached. This analysis is
quite rational. Just because a President commits a felony, even
a felony that is presumptively an impeachable offense, it does
not follow that he should be convicted of that felony or be impeached. First, the American public appears to be exercising the
power of jury nullification. 34 Clinton may be technically guilty,
but he should not be found guilty for such an understandable
unwillingness to lie about his consensual affairs. Second, an offense can be impeachable without warranting impeachment, just
as an act can be criminal without warranting punishment. If
Clinton gets off, the controversy may only stand for the principle
that perjury is an impeachable offense, but is not always sufficient grounds for actual impeachment, particularly when the
perjury involves consensual sexual activity. I certainly would
never advise any Presidents to perjure themselves, hoping to escape political and legal trouble under the Clinton precedent.
Thus, on one level, many Americans are accepting an aspect of
Clinton's "privacy" argument; he should not be driven from office
because of perjury related to his sexual conduct. 3 5 But they are
not necessarily accepting the broadest implications of his privacy
claim. First, his acts were not "private" in the sense that perjury
and obstruction of justice are not private. Nor is sexual contact
with an office subordinate purely private. It is one thing to be a
libertine, it is another to turn one's workplace into a sexual hothouse. Third, it is hard to argue that someone has a complete
right to sexual privacy after a sexual harassment claim has been
brought. Under such a theory, defendants could lie about consensual sexual matters at the workplace that did not involve the
34 See Michael Stakes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation:Some Modest ProposalsFrom the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 671, 689 (1995) (defining jury nullification as deliberate disregard for the law because one thinks it unjust). See generally Jack B. Weintstein, Considering Jury "Nullification" When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
239, 239 (1993) (defining jury nullification as nullification which occurs when jury based
on its own sense of justice and fairness refuses to abide by law and convict in particular
case even though facts appear to allow no other conclusion but guilt).
35 See Robert Pear, Founding Fathers are Used to Build a Case for Clinton, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, at Al (discussing how Clinton's lawyers argued that founding fathers never intended to include sexual misconduct as impeachable offenses); David Rosenbaum, Law's Scope of Perjury is Pivotal in House Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1998, at
A5 (stating the Democrats do not believe President's sexual history is grounds for impeachment).
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plaintiff. It should be relevant that an employer had had sex
with other employees and given them special treatment unrelated to the quality of their job performance before he propositioned the plaintiff. It is worth remembering that Lewinsky got
a fine job at the Pentagon before Clinton's allies tried to find her
something even better. 36 Finally, the President should be held to
higher moral, legal, ethical, and constitutional standards.
Any exoneration of Clinton should not be interpreted as an acceptance of his advocates' related arguments that Presidents can
only be impeached for "official misconduct" or "crimes against
the State."3 7 It is not hard to recharacterize presidential perjury
as official misconduct, a betrayal of public trust, and a serious
threat to the rule of law and the Republic. The distinction, however, also fails because it does not make any sense. Under that
approach, a President could commit rape or murder without
raising any impeachment issues. Some will say that perjury is
not such a serious matter, that the Framers did not have such
personal crimes in mind when they passed the Constitution.
This argument has its own set of flaws. When crafting constitutional conventions, the American public need not and should not
be bound by the Framers' intentions, assuming they can be reasonably ascertained. Second, the Framers took oaths very seriously. Oaths are an essential part of the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution. As Chief Justice
Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison,3 8 he was obliged to
interpret and enforce the Constitution because he took an oath. 3 9
William Penn's colonial constitution for Pennsylvania set forth
an entire section condemning perjury. 4 0 The Framers saw them36 Excerpts From Testimony About Gifts to Lewinsky and Her Search for a Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, at Al (discussing President's attempt to find job for Lewinsky); see
also William Safire, Enter 'Mother Wit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A5 (discussing
President Clinton's attempt to find job for Lewinsky, with assistance from Vernon Jordan).
37 See Alison Mitchell, Judiciary Panel, in Party Vote, Urges Impeachment Hearings,
N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, at Al (voting to determine whether Congress wants to impeach
President Clinton based on its findings); Lowell Weiker, Let the President Go Forward,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, Al (stating purpose of impeachment is to determine President's
ability to hold office).
38 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39 See id. at 179 (stating that if oaths were not to be taken seriously they would be
solemn mockery).
40 Charter of Liberties and Frame of Government of the Province of Pennsylvania in

America, reprinted in COLONIAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1998):

XXVI. That all witnesses, coming, or called, to testify their knowledge in or to any
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selves as gentleman, bound by honor and dignity. 4 1 The entire
theory of social contract is premised upon people keeping their
commitments. 42 Obviously, many Framers did not have pure
sexual mores, but they were aware of more severe public standards. This country has never been eager to adopt aristocratic
conceptions of sexuality. At least in the North and Mid-Atlantic,
rigid Puritan and Quaker views predominated. 4 3 Alexander
Hamilton paid a huge political price when he confessed to adultery. 44 Jefferson lied about his sexual relations with Sally Hem45
mings when the issue emerged during a presidential campaign.
Whether one agrees with the American public and Congress or
not about Clinton (for what it's worth, I would have voted for impeachment if only to reassert the venality of perjury and to condemn his use of military violence abroad to shore up his miserable Presidency 46 ), the Constitution has processed this tawdry
issue in reasonable fashion. It is too much to ask for an elegant
ending to what has been an inherently degrading political experience caused both by Clinton's reckless behavior and the equally
hypocritical actions of his opponents. There is no reason for the
Court to revisit Nixon v. United States,4 7 except to extend its
matter or thing, in any court, or before any lawful authority, within the said province, shall there give or delivery in their evidence, or testimony, by solemnly promising to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to the matter, or
thing in question. And in case any person so called to evidence, shall be convicted of
willful falsehood, such person shall suffer and undergo such damage or penalty, as
the person, or persons, against whom he or she bore false witness, did, or should,
undergo; and shall also make satisfaction to the party wronged, and be publicly exposed as a false witness, never to be credited in any court, or before any Magistrate,
in the said province.

Id.
41 See GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992) (discussing ruling class' belief that they were "gentlemen").
42 See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 189-201 (C.B. MacPherson, intro.,
1985) (1651). Hobbes, however, did not feel that an oath was relevant to the basic formation of the contract. Id. at 201.
43 See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKwAYS IN AMERICA
(1989) (discussing Puritan and Quaker mores).
44 See GAIL COLLINS, SCORPION TONGUES (1998) (discussing public backlash triggered
by Hamilton's adultery).
45 See Dinita Smith & Nicholas Wade, DNA Test Finds Evidence of Jefferson Child by
Slave, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at Al (referring to Jefferson's denial of affair with
slave).
46 See James Bennet, Clinton, Dogged by Scandal, Juggled Politics and Bombing,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al (discussing bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan); Alison
Mitchell, Impeachment Vote in House Delayed as Clinton Launches Iraq Air Strike, Citing Military Need to Move Swiftly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1998, at Al (discussing bombing
of Iraq).
47 506 U.S. 224 (1993).

1999]

THE CULTURE OFANEMPIRE

holding to virtually all issues arising under impeachment controversies. Nor should Congress attempt to delegate any of these
points to the Courts. This is one of those constitutional issues
where the Court had the last word in saying who has the last
word in particular cases, namely Congress. Imagine the process
if Nixon had gone the other way. We probably already would be
in litigation. The airwaves would abound with legalistic complaints about process and substance. Clinton's defenders would
really be saying something significant when they assert there is
no "legal case" against the President. Constitutional scholars
would be cooking up all kinds of clever arguments. Even this
event has not been immune to such creativity. Professor Bruce
Ackerman asserted that the Court might (or perhaps should)
enjoin the impeachment proceedings if they are not resolved before the current Congress adjourns. 4 8 Admittedly, this argument
is not completely precluded by Nixon v. United States, which
only dealt with the procedures used in impeachment trials. 4 9
One can reasonably hope, however, that the Court would dismiss
this clever argument as yet another procedural challenge to impeachment that is precluded by the political question doctrine.
It also is a bad idea. The country needs to be able to get this
process over with very quickly. Imagine a truly dangerous or
even insane President. Are we going to restart the prosecutorial
process because we only discover these problems toward the end
of a congressional term? The next Congress has a variety of
ways to change its mind, should it do so. A new set of House of
Representatives could pass a resolution recommending that the
Senate drop the trial. The Senate could also terminate proceedings, concluding either that President did not commit an impeachable offense or that his impeachable offense did not warrant impeachment.
So where is the good news, the hope, amidst this mess? On
the level of constitutional theory and practice, the Clinton scandal demonstrates that Presidents, even Presidents in their second term, need the continuing support of a majority of the
American people. Although the Senate apparently did not adopt
48 See David E. Rosenbaum, Come January, House Vote May Not Matter, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1998, at A23 (discussing Ackerman's suggestion that another vote by new house
may be necessary).
49 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
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the convention that lying and perjury is a per se offense, there is

no doubt that Clinton has paid a heavy price, in terms of reputation, effectiveness, and historical stature, for his indiscretions.
Clinton's stumbling and Gingrich's fall are a welcome reminder
to America's political elite that they are ultimately accountable
to the American electorate. It is also reassuring to see that the
American constitutional system-a weird mix of text, legal doctrine, conventions, public opinion, and systems of representation-has handled this farce so well. The House will have
"tarred" Clinton by impeaching him for perjury, obstruction of
justice, and abuse of power by refusing to cooperate with the
House Judiciary Committee. But, the Senate, which contains
forty-five Democratic Senators, did not "feather" Clinton and
"run him out of town" by fully impeaching him. Thus the Constitutional system has weathered this politicalllegal storm far better than the two political parties that currently operate under its
restraining influences.
Unfortunately, this farce quickly degenerated into tragedy.
The most immediate effect of President Clinton's being caught at
his sexual escapades has been his sudden eagerness to use force
abroad. In the eight months since Lewinsky's infamous dress
proved he had sexual relations with her, Clinton authorized
American bombing of four counrties: Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Serbia. Until then, he generally resisted the War Party, led
by Secretary of State Madeline Albright. Except for the damage
and killings, the attacks in the first three countries was largely
symbolic. But Clinton's fear of the political backlash that would
be caused by American deaths joined Albright's confidence in the
efficacy of bombing to accelerate the misery of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Although we can hope that
there will be some eventual compromise, the bombings did not
deter Serbia, dramatically increased ethnic cleansing and genocide, violated international law by violating the basic concept of
sovereignty without obtaining United Nations authorization, angered such potential rivals as Russia and China, and solidified
Serbian support for Milosevich's evil actions. Thus, at least
when this article was written, the United States and NATO have
used questionable, inadequate means to achieve a desirable end.
Meanwhile the United States must wrestle with this difficult
problem under the leadership of a President who changed him-
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self from a "lame duck" into a "crippled duck," unable to command much moral authority, respect, or confidence.
The really good news is that we retain the structure of a
republic, even if we often have the political culture of an empire.
Clinton, like emperors of old, thought he was above the law and
that one of the primary perks of his job was sexual conquest.
Washington, D.C. remains an imperial city filled with courtiers,
now known as congressional members, lobbyists, public relations
experts, and lawyers. Conspicuous consumption and barely legal
corruption have become basic operating principles. So how does
a single citizen fight back? Stop watching television. You will
feel a lot safer, enjoy the company of the average American a lot
more because you will not see them constantly represented by
the egomaniacs who populate national television; and you will
have more time to read and think for yourself. Finally, do not
support any candidate who is beholden to big money.

